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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
of the grand jury minutes at the trial, then if defense counsel seeks them for crossexamination he may examine them only if the court, upon inspection, has found
that they contain material at variance with the testimony given by the particular
witness on the stand.9 7 The rule as to disclosure of statements in the custody of
the district attorney, for purposes of cross examination, is similar to that applying
98
to grand jury minutes.
In People v. Lee 9 the Court deal with a decision of the Appellate
Division1 which reversed the convictions of two defendants (Sarra and McCarthy) for admitted error in the admission of evidence, and dismissed the indictment as to the third (Lee) on the ground that the complaintant's identification of
him as a participant in an alleged robbery and assault was insufficient to go to the
jury. On appeal Sarra and McCarthy claimed that the lower court erred in not
dismissing the indictment as to them, because complainant had a criminal record
and was not to be believed. On cross appeal the State argued, as to Lee, that the
Appellate Division lacked the power to dismiss his indictment. The court held
that the questions of fact were for the jury in both cases.
The court reindorsed the well entrenched principle that pollution of the
source of testimony does not automatically brand it as mendacious, 2 but due to
the admitted error a new trial was ordered. The court found error in the dismissal
of Lee's indictment by the Appellate Division because there was sufficient evidence
upon which the jury could base its decision.
Charging Lower Counts
The common law rule has been incorporated into statute s that, if a defendant
could be found guilty of a lesser degree of any crime charged in the indictment,
the trial judge must submit such lower offense 4 unless no conceivable view of the
evidence would allow the jury to find the defendant innocent of the higher crime
97.
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See, e.g., People v. Boniello, 303 N. Y. 619, 101 N. E. 2d 483 (1951).
People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. 140, 186 N. E. 422 (1933).
308 N. Y. 302, 125 N. E. 2d 580 (1955).

1. 283 App. Div. 876, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 201 (2d Dep't 1955).
2. People v. Landers, 264 N. Y. 119, 190 N. E. 204 (1934); People v. Ai'ata,
255 N. Y. 374, 174 N. E. 758 (1931).

3.

N. Y. CODE CRIM.

PROC.

§444; "Upon an indictment for a crime consisting

of different degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree
charged in the indictment, and guilty of any degree inferior thereto, or of an
attempt to commit the crime..."
§445 pprovides, "In all other (than §444) cases, the defendant may be found
guilty of any crime, the commission of which is necessarily included In that
with which he is charged in the indictment."
4. People v. Lapolte, 253 N. Y. 573, 171 N. E. 788 (1930); People v, SilerW,
246 N. Y. 262, 158 N. E. 615 (1927).
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yet guilty of the lower. 5 In People v. Mussenden6 the court found such a situation,
where three of defendant's confreres accosted complainant (while defendant
waited in their car), assaulted him, and unsuccessfully attempted to take his wallet.
In their defense they alleged that complainant's entire story was mendacious, that
they had merely asked him for directions when he became excited and created a
scene. The Grand Jury charged in separate counts (1) Attempted Robbery, first
degree; (2) Attempted Grand Larceny, first degree; (3) Assault, second degree.
The trial judge submitted only the first count to the jury, which the Court of
Appeals held to be proper.
The dissent argued that the jury would have been warranted in viewing
defendant's conduct as not amounting to an attempt, 7 or merely as second degree
Assault, if they chose to disregard that part of complainant's story relating to his
wallet.8 Therefore defendant's rights were substantially prejudiced when the jury
was placed in the dilemma of either acquitting or convicting on the maximum
count. Since the defendant chose to stand or fall on his version of the facts, it
does not appear that his rights were stibstantially prejudiced when the trial judge
refused to charge crimes of which defendant could have been guilty only on highly
conjectural views of the testimony which were not even urged by defendant
during trial.
Sentencing
The case of People v. Tower presented the anomaly of a defendant's contending that his prior record proved he was beyond redemption, 10 and hence the
sentencing judge erred in placing him in a correctional institution (maximum
term: three years);11 if sentence of a punitive nature had been pronounced, only
one year could have been imposed for his unlawful entry.' 2 Defendant also contended that the trial judge's recommendation that defendant not be released until
he had served the maximum term was error. The court held the sentencing court
was free to conclude that defendant was not incapable of rehabilitation even
5. Peopld v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 102-3; 158 N. E. 35, 36 (1927); People v.
Schleiman, 197 N. Y. 383, 390; 90 N. E. 950, 953 (1910).
6. 308 N. Y. 558, 127 N. E. 2d 551 (1955).
7. People v. Rizzo, 246 N. Y. 334, 158 N. E. 888 (1927); People v. Werblow,
241 N. Y. 55, 148 N. E. 786 (1925).
8. That this is within the province of the jury, see People v. Rytel, 284 N. Y.
242, 245; 30 N. E. 2d 578, 580 (1940).
9. 308 N. Y. 123, 123 N. E. 805 (1954).
10. N. Y. CORRECTION LAW §203 (e) provides "This article shall not apply to
any person who is . . . (3) Insane, or mentally or physically incapable of being
substantially benefitted by being committed to a correctional or reformatory
institution."
11. Id., §203 (b): "The court in imposing sentence shall not fix or limit
the term of imprisonment of any person sentenced to any such penitentiary. The
shall not exceed three years."
term of such imprisonment ...
12. N. Y. PENAL LAv §§405, 1937.

